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Abstract
Wage ratios between di¤erent percentiles of the wage distribution have moved in parallel and
then diverged in the U.S. in the last 50 years. In this paper, I study the theoretical response
of wage ratios to skill-biased technical change and trade integration. I build a simple model
of heterogeneous technology and workers that features complementarities between the quality
of ideas and abilities. I show that both shocks can reproduce the observed pattern since (i)
they have similar asymmetric e¤ects on productive vs. unproductive rms, and (ii) positive
assortative matching in the labor market transmits this asymmetry across high and low skill
workers. Focusing on the di¤erent channels through which skill-biased technical change and
trade integration operate suggests ways to disentangle the magnitude of each.
Keywords: intra-industry trade; skill-biased technical change; local change in inequality;
intra-rm rent distribution.
1 Introduction
Wage inequality in the United States has grown since the sixties, both across observable character-
istics (e.g. college/high school premium, see Murphy and Welch (1992)) and within them (residual
inequality, see Juhn Murphy and Pierce (1993)). This growth has not been uniform throughout
the whole wage distribution: a widespread increase in inequality until the late eighties has then
evolved into a polarization of the wage distribution, with inequality increasing in the right tail and
Department of Economics, Ph.D. program, The University of Chicago. Contact: fmonte@uchicago.edu. The rst
version of this work was discussed in February 2004 as undergraduate dissertation at Bocconi University, Italy, under
the title "Commercio Internazionale, Eterogeneitae Diseguaglianze nella Distribuzione del Reddito". I am deeply
indebted toward Paolo Epifani and Fabrizio Onida for their guidance on that work. A longer version of this paper
has circulated at various times in the past years under the title "Two Sided Heterogeneity, Technology and Trade".
Thomas Chaney, James Heckman, Samuel Kortum and Ralph Ossa provided patient guidance, insightful critiques
and careful comments and suggestions on this project. This paper has greatly beneted from discussions with Pierre
AndreChiappori, Jonathan Eaton, Paolo Epifani, Stefania Garetto, Gene Grossman, Lance Lochner, Marc Melitz,
Marc-Andreas Muendler, Lars Nesheim, Jaromir Nosal, Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, Nancy Stokey and participants at
the working groups on Capital Theory and International Trade and the University of Chicago, and International
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attening out, or even decreasing, in the lower tail1 (see Card and DiNardo (2002), Piketty and
Saez (2003) and (2004), and Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005), (2006) and (2008)).
Skill-biased technical change has been considered the most prominent candidate for an explana-
tion (e.g. Bound and Johnson (1992), Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998), Autor, Levy and Murnane
(2003)), while international trade integration has been found to contribute to a signicant but mi-
nor part of this change (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1991), Feenstra and Hanson (1996), (1999)).
However, most trade-based explanations have been looking for the consequences of exchanges be-
tween countries with di¤erent skill prices, whereas for long time international trade has mainly
occurred between countries with similar endowments (Baldwin and Martin (1999)). Motivated by
this evidence on the behavior of inequality and trade patterns, I ask: can skill-biased technical
change and trade integration between identical countries produce the same observed pattern for
inequality? I show that because of positive assortative matching in the labor market, the answer
is yes. I then argue that focusing on the specic channels of each mechanisms, one can gain fur-
ther insights into how to disentangle them. My example will concentrate on the intra-rm rent
distribution.
My starting point is the well-established nding that this growth in inequality is due to a large
increase in the relative demand for skills that has occurred, especially since the late seventies, in the
U.S. economy2. Wage inequality, as measured for example by the standard deviation of log-wages,
or as the ratio between the values at the 90th vs. the 10th percentile in the distribution (p90=p10
ratio), has increased sharply until 1987, and increased modestly afterwards3. This deceleration
hides a strong increase in the right tail (p90=p50) and a constant or decreasing inequality in the
lower tail (p50=p10) of the distribution4, and it emphasizes the necessity to study the evolution of
wage inequality in di¤erent regions of the skill distribution.
Several studies have documented empirically and justied theoretically how the properties of
substitution and complementarity of computers with di¤erent tasks and abilities can generate these
patterns5. On the other hand, international trade has been tested as if imports increased the supply
of unskilled labor6. Some studies have expected trade to reallocate labor force towards sectors with
comparative advantage. These reallocations are typically found to be weak and dominated by
1The ratio of wages at the 50th vs. 10th percentile, and 90th vs. 50th percentile in the distribution, grew each
approximately 10% from 1973 to 1987. After that, the lower tail attened, while the upper tail continued to grow
10% more through 2004.
2See for example Katz and Murphy (1992) for a discussion of labor demand and supply forces. June, Murphy
and Pierce (1993), among other things, also discuss the di¤erent timings in the evolution of total and residual wage
inequality.
3See Card and DiNardo (2002).
4Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005), (2006) and (2008) provide evidence on the polarization of the wage distribution.
Piketty and Saez (2003) and (2004) provide evidence on the behavior of wage ratios among top earners.
5Bound and Johnson (1992) provides an empirical comprehensive approach. Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998)
show evidence of the relation between wage inequality and the timing and di¤usion of computers across industries;
Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) investigate the role of computers, skills and tasks in the production function.
6For example, Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1991) and Murphy and Welch (1992) convert net imports into labor
supply equivalents, rst assuming that the impact of imports and exports is the same across skill groups, and then
assuming that only imports a¤ect the net supply of unskilled workers.
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reallocation of labor force within sectors7. Other studies have then considered the consequences of
outsourcing of low skill-intensive tasks to unskilled-labor abundant countries, which would look like
intra-industry trade, nding larger e¤ects8. These approaches are, for that period, at odds with
most of the world trade being between developed countries with similar endowments9.
In light of this evidence, my contribution focuses the attention squarely on intra-industry trade,
and builds a simple model of trade and labor markets capable of incorporating skill-biased technical
change. I consider two identical economies with varieties characterized by heterogeneous e¢ ciencies
in their technology, in the spirit of Melitz (2003) and Bernard, Jensen, Eaton and Kortum (2003). I
extend this framework along the lines of Lucas (1978), by assuming that workers are heterogeneous
in their ability to run any rm (if they choose so), while being identical as production workers at the
rmsproduction lines. A rm is then made up by an idea, a manager, and production workers.
Complementarities between technology and ability imply positive assortative matching between
managers and technological e¢ ciency10, producing a "superstars" e¤ect as in Rosen (1981). The
occupational choice implies that the wage of the manager if she was a production worker plays the
role of the xed cost to access the domestic market, giving rise to increasing returns to scale at the
rm level (as in Krugman (1979)), even in a closed economy. A xed cost of exporting produces
the endogenous selection of most productive rms in the foreign market, and trade is assumed to
be balanced.11
With these assumptions, I eliminate by design any e¤ect of trade on inequality through decits
or exchanges with countries relatively more endowed with unskilled labor, thus avoiding the most
common arguments against trade-based explanations for the evolution of inequality. However,
the economy features a wage function that depends on the individual ability, microfounded in a
simple model of the labor market: hence, I can study the equilibrium response of wage ratios to
trade integration and skill-biased technical change at di¤erent points in the skill distribution. I
model trade integration as a reduction in the iceberg cost of export, and skill-biased technical
change as an increase in the contribution of ideas to rm-level productivity, whereby, because
of complementarities, high skill managers gain more than proportionately relative to low skill
managers.
To capture the response in any region of the skill distribution, I frame the discussion in terms
7For example, Bound and Johnson (1992) look for reallocations of workers between industries due to shift in product
demand, and actually nd that these shifts are slightly reducing the demand of college graduates. This nding leads
them to look for the consequences of skill-biased technical change on within-industry changes in demand. Weak
reallocations across and strong skill-upgrading within detailed sectors in manufacturing industry are also reported in
Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994).
8Feenstra and Hanson (1996), (1999) calculate a measure of intermediate input outsourcing at sector level. To
this end, they use data from input-output matrices to infer the total impact of imports on any given sector.
9For example, Baldwin and Martin (1999) document that two-thirds of contemporary world trade occurs among
rich countries with similar factor endowments, and three-fourths of this share is two-way trade within narrowly dened
industries. See also Helpman (1999), for a discussion.
10Sattinger (1979) is the rst to propose this framework. This paper generalizes his contribution, introducing a
fully-edged general equilibrium model where the outside options are endogenously determined. Sattinger (1993)
gives a review and a motivation for using assingment models to study wage distributions.
11The paper is thus consistent with size, skill, wage and productivity premia of exporters (e.g. Bernard and Jensen,
(1995), (1997), (1999)) and positive size-wage relation across rms (e.g. Oi and Idson (1999)).
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of wage ratios between two marginally di¤erent managers. In the paper, I show that while trade
integration and skill-biased technical change operate on local wage ratios through partially di¤erent
channels, they produce a similar asymmetric e¤ect across rms: low productivity rms face tougher
competition, while rms at the high end of the productivity range increase their earnings. Because
of positive assortative matching in the labor market, this asymmetry is transmitted across low and
high skill managers. I prove that, under some assumptions, there exist unique thresholds abilities
above which local inequality increases, and below which local inequality decreases. Whether the
wage ratio between two abilities s0 and s00 increases or decreases will depend, for both trade and skill-
biased technical change, on the position of these abilities s0 and s00 with respect to those thresholds.
Only studying the evolution of wage dispersion in di¤erent regions of the wage distribution is not
su¢ cient to disentangle the source of the pattern.
This observational equivalence may help explain why international trade has been attributed
only a limited role in the evolution of inequality observed in the last 50 years. However, I do
not aim to propose uni-causal explanations and dismiss the importance of skill-biased technical
change or of other channels of trade integration12: on the one hand, my model only applies to the
manufacturing sector, which has been explicitly studied in this literature13, but is certainly not
the largest part of the economy; on the other hand, trade with developing countries has grown
in importance in recent years14, and my model addresses - by choice - only intra-industry trade
based on love-for-variety motivations. Rather, I intend to emphasize why intra-industry, balanced
trade can by itself produce quite articulated behavior on economy-wide wage ratios by proposing
a very simple extension of the recently developed theoretical literature on rm-level heterogeneity
and trade.
If skill-biased technical change and trade integration can both rationalize the pattern for in-
equality in the U.S. economy that the literature has documented, what can tell the two causes
apart? I propose to exploit the di¤erences in the way skill-biased technical change and trade in-
tegration operate. My focus is on the intra-rm rent distribution, where I call "rent" the sum of
prots and the managers wage, less the opportunity cost of ideas and managers in the alternative
occupation (zero and the production worker wage, respectively)15. In the paper, I show that the
share of the rent received by the manager is only a function of the relative contribution of managers
and ideas to the rm-level productivity. The intra-rm rent distribution is not modied by trade
integration because trade costs inuence the marginal contribution of managers and ideas in the
same way (thus, only competitiveness across rms is a¤ected). Hence, changes in inequality not ac-
companied by change in the intra-rm rent distribution must be attributed to trade. On the other
12Also, skill-biased technical change and trade integration are by no means the only two explanations put forth.
For example, deunionization and declining real minimum wages have also been studied (see for example DiNardo,
Fortin and Lemieux (1996) and Lemieux (2006)).
13See Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994).
14See for example Krugman (2008).
15For related literature on how wages and prots are distributed within rms, see for example Blanchower, Oswald,
and Sanfey (1996), who infer the existence of sharing rules by merging CPS and the NBER productivity database,
and Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999), who propose a statistical decomposition of employer-employee matched
dataset.
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hand, changes in the intra-rm rent distribution must imply changes in local inequality caused by
skill-biased technical change. This result is very dependent on the functional form assumptions,
and only provides partial conditions. However, it serves the purpose of illustrating a more general
point: progress can be made by explicitly spelling out the di¤erent mechanisms through which these
two forces operate, and focusing on their di¤erent implications at rm level.
My model makes use of assignment concepts used recently in various forms to discuss the impact
of information and communication technology on the wage distribution in closed economy (Garicano
(2000), Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006)) or the evolution of managerial compensation (Gabaix
and Landier (2008), Terviö (2008)). The paper capitalizes on rm-level heterogeneity models
(Manasse and Turrini (2001), Melitz (2003), Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003), Helpman,
Melitz and Yeaple (2005), Yeaple (2005), Chaney (2008)) and extend them enriching the details
of the human capital aspects. This contribution is part of a recent literature applying assignment
models to trade: see Blanchard and Willmann (2008) for educational and occupational choices,
Kremer and Maskin (2006), Antràs, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and Nocke and Yeaple
(2008) for applications to o¤shoring, and Costinot (2009) and Costinot and Vogel (2010) for general
theoretical approaches. The relation between trade integration and skill premium has also been
intensively studied in alternative frameworks: see Matsuyama (2007) (who assumes a skill-intensive
technology to export), Epifani and Gancia (2008) (who use two sectors di¤ering in skill intensity
and two skills), Verhoogen (2008) (on the implications of skill-upgrading for developing countries),
Amiti and Davis (2008) and Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) (studying the implication of fair wage
concerns on e¤ort), Burstein and Vogel (2009) (who study the e¤ects of trade on between vs.
within sector wage inequality), Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010) and Helpman (2010) (for
the interplay of trade and labor market frictions on inequality and unemployment)16. None of these
papers study or compare the response of wage ratios to trade and skill-biased technical change across
the ability spectrum.
In the rest of the paper, I will describe the model in closed economy (section 2) and provide a
motivation for the theoretical framework used in analyzing wage ratios, applying this to skill-biased
technical change (section 3). In section 4, I extend the model to an open economy framework, while
in section 5 I show how wage ratios respond to skill-biased technical change and trade integration.
Section 6 argues why the intra-rm rent distribution can help in disentangling these two forces.
Section 7 provides some concluding remarks.
2 The Closed Economy
In this section, I introduce the framework and explain how the assignment mechanism generates a
non-trivial wage function. I then derive the equilibrium in closed economy.
16A parallel literature, less related, studies the implication of trade on wage inequality in developing countries,
where skill premia are also increasing, contrary to the most standard Hecksher-Ohlin predictions. See the review of
Goldberg and Pavcnick (2007), and references therein.
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2.1 Consumers, Managers, and Ideas
The representative consumer maximizes a standard CES utility function where, from an innite
mass of varieties potentially available, a subset J of them is produced and aggregated as
Y =
Z
j2J
y (j)( 1)= dj
=( 1)
with  > 1: Standard optimization implies that each consumer spends
x (j) =

p (j)
P
1 
X (1)
on each variety produced, where P =
hR
j2J p (j)
1  dj
i1=(1 )
is the ideal price index of good Y
and X is total consumersexpenditure on it. To x ideas, I think of di¤erent j as di¤erent varieties,
or production lines; however, I will interchangeably use the term "rm", implicitly assuming one
product per rm.
Three inputs are necessary for a production line to exists: an idea, a manager, and production
workers in proportion to output.
Varieties di¤er according to the state of the technology available for their production: denoting
with z 2 (0;+1) the quality of an idea, I assume that there is a measure G (z) = Tz 1 of ideas
at least as good as z. This specication ensures that there is a su¢ cient number of ideas, however
bad, to accommodate any number of managers in equilibrium. Ideas are owned by a mutual fund
that maximizes prots and redistributes them equally across agents17.
The economy is populated by a mass L of agents, which, as in Lucas (1978), can choose to
work either as production workers or as managers. Agents are heterogeneous in their managerial
ability, while they all have a unit e¢ ciency as production workers. The ability s is also distributed
according to a power law: for s 2 [1;+1), there is a measure L (s) = Ls 1 of potential managers
with ability of at least s.
While in Lucas (1978) potential managers di¤er by their ability to run larger rms that produce
a homogeneous nal product, here I assume that there are complementarities between managerial
ability and idea e¢ ciency: the total rms productivity of a pair (z; s) is
' (z; s) = zs
with  > 0,  > 0.18 ;19 The parameter  measures the inuence of managersability: while  = 0
reduces this model to a simple one-sided heterogeneity framework, increasing  lets a rm gain
more from a better manager. Moreover, there is a simple mapping between abilities and percentiles
17The assumption of equal redistribution is immaterial to the rest of the paper, since I am interested in wage
(rather than income) distribution. Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) discuss relative merits of these two alternatives.
18This assumption satises log-supermodularity as in Costinot (2009).
19 In Appendix A.1 I show that assuming an exponent of  1 for the quality of ideas and the ability of managers is
without loss of generality.
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in the skill and wage distributions: the ability s is always collocated at the 100(1 s 1)th percentile.
Agents who choose to be production workers earn a wage w, which is then also the opportunity
cost of being a manager. This wage is the numeraire and will be normalized to 1; I leave it here
explicitly for clarity. If y units of a variety are to be produced in a rm with productivity ', y='
e¢ ciency units of work from production workers are used. Denote as
v (p;')  x (p)  wx (p)
p'
the surplus of this rm (the excess of revenues over costs for production workers), if the price p is
chosen. When using a manager s, a rm with idea quality z sets a price which solves
 (z; s)  max
p
v (p;' (z; s))
implying an optimal price of
p (z; s) =

   1
w
zs
(2)
For a given quality z, the optimal price is a function of the ability of the manager s chosen to run
the rm. The labor market balances incentives across rms in the choice of managers: this balance
is the subject of the next section.
2.2 Assignment
Substituting the revenue function (1) and the optimal price (2) in the expression for v (p;'), the
surplus for a rm (z; s) is rewritten as
v (z; s) = M

zs
w
 1
(3)
M  1



   1
1 
XP  1
The term M measures the size of the market. A larger expenditure level X, or weaker competition
through a higher price index P; both make the market bigger and raise the surplus for any rm.
The surplus must cover payments to the manager of ability s, residually determining prots for
the idea z. I following Sattinger (1979) and assume that a rm is unable to a¤ect the prevailing
labor market conditions: the wage function w (s) is taken as given. The problem of the ideas
owner20 is then
 (z) = max
s2[1;1)
fv (z; s)  w (s)g
The complementarity between managers and ideas creates an incentive for better rms to hire
better managers: a marginal increase in s always raises the total surplus, but this increase is larger
20This is not the only way to characterize the earning functions. Since the problem is symmetric in managers and
ideas, we could start with the managers choosing ideas. Alternatively, we could have each side choose the other (as
in Sattinger (1979)). In each case, the resulting earning functions would be identical.
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when the quality of the idea z is higher (i.e., the cross derivative of the surplus v1;2 (z; s) is positive).
The possibility to choose the manager generates an incentive towards positive assortative matching
between managers and ideas.
The optimal ability s is chosen to balance the marginal benet of a better manager (higher
productivity and larger surplus) with her marginal cost (higher wage demanded). In an optimum,
v2 (z; s)jz=z(s) = w0 (s) (4)
gives a condition that can be used to trace out the wage function when the left hand side is evaluated
at the idea quality z which chooses s optimally, i.e., at z = z (s).
To build the equilibrium wage function, I proceed under the tentative assumption of positive
assortative matching, z0 (s) > 0, and later show that it holds in equilibrium because of comple-
mentarities in production. Matching the measures at the right tail of the distributions, positive
assortative matching implies Tz 1 = Ls 1, or
z = ts, s = z=t, with t  T=L (5)
The parameter t is a measure of the relative size of the technology available in the country. A
larger population L increases the availability of managers at all levels of ability, so that any idea z
can be matched with a better s; any potential manager gets hurt by a larger L, though, since the
mass of people better than her is also larger21.
A simple expression for the marginal rent w0 (s) in (4) can be obtained di¤erentiating the
surplus (3) with respect to s and plugging z (s) from (5) in it. Integrating this expression over the
ability dimension and using the fact that the marginal manager - denote her skill level sc - must
be indi¤erent between occupations, I obtain the wage function:
w (s) =
Z s
sc
v2 (z; )jz=z() d =

+ 

t
w
 1
M

s(+)( 1)   s(+)( 1)c

+ w (6)
and with w (s) = w below sc.
The prot function  (z) is the di¤erence between the surplus and the wage, and leaves the
marginal idea zc indi¤erent to the alternative of not being used. Using the assignment function (5)
in the surplus (3) and subtracting the wage (6),
 (z) = v (z; s (z))  w (s (z)) = 
+ 

t 
w
 1
M

z(+)( 1)   z(+)( 1)c

(7)
with  (z) = 0 below zc.
The su¢ cient condition for an optimum will require that v22 (z; s)  w00 (s) < 0 when z = z (s)
21To parallel the terminology of Costinot and Vogel (2010), this would be skill-upgrading from the standpoint of
the rm, and rm-downgrading (which they call task-downgrading) from the point of view of a manager.
8
(i.e., along the optimal assignment), which can be easily shown to be true22.
The equilibrium assignment of managers to rms provides a simple microfoundation for the
rent sharing within a rm. The rent to be shared is v (s ; z (s))  w, the excess of surplus over the
sum of managers and ideasopportunity cost ( w and 0 respectively); the sharing rule is based on
local scarcity of talents vs. ideasand their contributions to the total productivity of the rm. The
share of this rent going to managerswages is
  
+ 
If managers do not inuence the rms e¢ ciency ( = 0), the rent for talent is zero, the equilibrium
wage function reduces to the outside option, and we are back to the standard one-sided heterogeneity
case similar to Melitz (2003), where workers contributions are homogeneous and the wage per
e¢ ciency unit is at across ability levels. On the other hand, if  = 0 we recover a model similar
to Lucas (1978) and Manasse and Turrini (2001), where heterogeneous workers are operating using
homogeneous ideas: prots then are zero, and only a non-trivial wage function remains23.
2.3 Equilibrium
To characterize the equilibrium in a closed economy, it is su¢ cient to determine the cuto¤ sc for
managersability and the expenditure level X in the economy. These two values must (i) keep in
equilibrium the market for production workers and (ii) make the marginal rm indi¤erent between
operating or shutting down.
Note rst that using the price index denition, the individual rm price (2) and the assignment
function (5), and assuming (+ ) (   1) < 1, the price index has the form
P =

   1 w

 
L
1=( 1)
t s =( 1)c (8)
with
  1  (   1) (+ ) 2 (0; 1) (9)
The assumption (+ ) (   1) < 1 guarantees that there are no rms e¢ cient enough to bring
down the price index P to zero. Note that a larger relative measure of technology t reduces the
price of the nal good aggregate Y . Also, the scale of the economy has welfare consequences:
22The second order condition for the optimality of s in the rm problem requires v22 (z; s)   w00 (s) < 0. Di¤er-
entiating (4) again with respect to s we get w00 (s) = v22 (z; s) + v12 (z; s) z0 (s), which implies w00 (z)   v22 (z; s) =
v12 (z; s) z
0 (s). Using (3), we have v12 (z; s) =M w1  (   1)2 z( 1) 1s( 1) 1 > 0. Hence, v22 (z; s) w00 (s) <
0 , v12 (z; s) z0 (s) > 0, s0 (z) > 0.
23A simpler way to reach the same earning functions could be to assume an exogenous rm-level productivity
distribution and a xed rent-sharing rule. For the questions I pose, this choice is not possible. As I will argue below,
the proper way to think about skill-biased technical change in this framework is to keep xed the distribution of
managersability, while changing the impact of ideas through increases in . With this experiment, not only does
the share of rents to managers decrease, but the overall rm productivity distribution improves. Studying the e¤ect
of a change in an exogenous rent sharing parameter we would miss the second part.
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xing t, the price index is still a decreasing function of the measure of population L. A scale e¤ect
typically arises in presence of xed costs: in this framework, the xed cost is implicitly given by
the opportunity cost that each manager has in terms of her alternative occupation.
With an expression for the price index, we can write down the two general equilibrium condi-
tions.
When sc is the managerscuto¤, L w
 
1  s 1c

is earned by production workers. The aggregate
expenditure on production workers is always  1 X.
24 Equating these two values, the level of
expenditure X compatible with the supply of production workers implied by sc is
X =

   1L w
 
1  s 1c

(10)
This curve describes the Labor Market Clearing relation in the market for production workers.
When sc ! 1, total earnings of production workers are zero, and so must be the expenditure X; as
sc !1, all agents are employed as production workers, and total expenditure on them approaches
a nite constant. The expenditure is increasing in the cuto¤ sc since as sc grows, there is a larger
supply of production workers, which requires a larger expenditure in equilibrium.
In equilibrium, the idea and the manager in the marginal rm (sc; z (sc)) are indi¤erent between
production in the rm and their alternative employment, and the surplus function (3) for the
indi¤erent pair of agents is equal to the sum of the outside options; using the assignment relation
(5) and the price index (8),
X =

 
L ws 1c (11)
This equation is a Zero Cuto¤Earnings condition. As sc ! 1 the right-hand side becomes a strictly
positive and nite number, while as sc grows toward innity, this curve goes to zero. The curve
is decreasing in sc: if (sc; X) is an equilibrium point, and the expenditure becomes smaller, the
marginal manager is no longer able to cover her opportunity cost and becomes a production worker.
As shown in Figure 1, the equilibrium (sc; X) is always uniquely determined.
Figure 1 here.
This gure shows the equilibrium determination of the cuto¤ sc and the expenditure level X in closed
economy. The Labor Market Equilibrium represents the locus of pairs (sc; X) where the expenditure
over and the income of production workers are equalized; the Zero Cuto¤ Earnings is the locus of
points where the surplus of the marginal rm (sc; z (sc)) exactly covers the sum of outside options, so
that there is no incentive for entry or exit in the di¤erentiated varietiessector.
The simple functional forms assumed allow to solve explicitly for sc in terms of parameters:
24The expenditure on production workers for each rm is x (')   v (') ; substituting in it revenues (1), surplus
(3), the assignment function (5) and the price index (8), and integrating over all active rms, we get that the overall
expenditure on production workers is  1

X:
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equating (10) and (11), and using the denition (9) for  , I obtain
sc = 1 +
(   1)
1  (   1) (+ ) (12)
X =

 +    1L (13)
We can also rewrite the earning functions in more explicit terms. Exploiting the equilibrium relation
between the indi¤erent rm and the market size25, we can express wages (6) and prots (7) as:
w (s) = 
"
s
sc
(+)( 1)
  1
#
w + w (14)
 (z) = (1  )
"
z
zc
(+)( 1)
  1
#
w (15)
Using the expression for sc in (12) in the price index (8), the prot and wage functions can be
written in real terms and only as a function of parameters, as  (z) =P and w (s) =P above the
cuto¤s, and 0 and w=P below, respectively.
The equilibrium wage function is determined jointly by the distribution of abilities and tech-
nology, through a market mechanism which prices the relative scarcity of each type of factor.
The structure of the real earning functions has some characteristic elements.
The inverse of the price index gives a measure of the opportunity cost of keeping agents employed
as production workers: in fact, their real wage is exactly P 1, after normalizing w to 1.
The parameter   = (+ ) is a talent-specic component: total real rents in the rmh
(s=sc)
1    1
i
=P are split giving a share  to managers and a share 1   to ideas.
A microeconomic component, s=sc and z=zc, determines then earnings di¤erences between dif-
ferent levels of ability within managers, and within ideas.
In terms of the xed cost, another interpretation is that the manager (or the idea) pays a share
 (or 1 ) of the xed cost of being active and gets back her opportunity cost 1 (or 0, respectively).
The net xed payment is 1   for the manager, and   (1  ) for the idea. This interpretation will
be important to understand some parts of the open economy response of inequality.
In the next section, I use this framework to evaluate the consequences of skill-biased technical
change on the wage ratio at di¤erent percentiles in the wage distribution.
3 Skill-Biased Technical Change
This section analyzes the e¤ect of skill-biased technical change on an arbitrary wage ratio w (s00) =w (s0)
in a closed economy.
25Using the assignment function (5) to express the surplus (3) in terms of s, and imposing equality to w for the
marginal rm, M = wt ( 1)s (+)( 1)c = wt( 1)z
 (+)( 1)
c . I substitute the right hand side in terms of
sc in the expressions for wages (6) to obtain (14), and the right hand side in terms of zc in (7) to obtain (15).
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Before focusing on the substantive side of the issue, I provide a general motivation for the
theoretical framework used.
I dene skill-biased technical change as a change in technology which benets disproportionately
highly skilled managers. I do not attempt to explain the source of this change. Skill-biased technical
change is modeled as an exogenous increase in . This assumption implies that the percent increase
in productivity is biased toward rms which employ better managers: for a given ability s, the
elasticity of the productivity of the rm ts(+) to  is simply  ln ts, which is increasing in s26.
This is the only way in which, in this framework, skill-biased technical change can be modeled. An
increase in  would amount to a change in the distribution of abilities, which instead we want to
keep xed. A proportional increase in the productivity of all the rms is equivalent to an increase
in the e¢ ciency of production workers, and hence would not be skill biased.
The elasticity of the wage ratio w (s00) =w (s0) with respect to  is just the di¤erence of the elastic-
ities of the wage function evaluated at each point, "() (s00) "() (s0), with "() (s)  w (s)=w (s).
Since the abilities s0 and s00 can be chosen arbitrarily, it is convenient to recast the analysis in
terms of local changes in wage ratios, i.e., changes in the ratio of wages of two marginally di¤erent
managers. In the rest of the section, I show why this approach is helpful, and argue that it is a very
general way to think about the response of wage ratios to exogenous shocks in di¤erent regions of
the wage distribution; I will then adopt it in the rest of the paper.
Consider two agents with marginally di¤erent levels of ability, s and s + ds. The di¤erence
in their wage is essentially ws (s), the marginal price of skills at s, so that the wage ratio is just
1+ws (s) =w (s). Suppose now that  increases: if the marginal price of skills is more elastic than the
wage, the wage ratio w (s+ ds) =w (s), a measure of local inequality, increases. Since the di¤erence
in the wage between two arbitrary levels of ability s0 and s00 is the sum of all the marginal rents, the
response of their ratio w (s00) =w (s0) to skill-biased technical change must be related to the integral
of the local responses between s0 and s00. The formal argument (in Appendix A.2) shows that for
two ability levels s0 and s00, with s00 > s0, the elasticity of the wage ratio w (s00) =w (s0) to  is simplyZ s00
s0
ws (s)
w (s)
() (s) ds
with
() (s)  ws (s)
ws (s)
  w (s)
w (s)
(16)
being the local change in inequality at s when  changes. In this notation, w (s) = @w (s) =@
and ws (s) = @2w (s) = (@@s). The function () (s) is the di¤erence between the elasticity of the
marginal price of skills and the total price of skills to changes in : by construction, () (s) > 0
if and only if "() (s) is increasing in s. The (total) change in inequality between s0 and s00 is the
integral of all the local changes, weighted by ws (s) =w (s), a positive and unitless measure of the
importance of ability di¤erences. When for some s, () (s) > 0, the local contribution of s is to
26For example, at t =  = 1 a 1% increase in  raises the productivity of a rm employing a top 10% manager by
1.61 percentage points more than the median rm (in fact,  ln (ts00)    ln (ts0) =  ln (10=2) = 1:61).
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increase the response of all the wage ratios that contain it, and vice-versa.
Any model about the behavior of wage dispersion is essentially a specication of eq. (16). I
now examine in detail how skill-biased technical change a¤ects () (s) in this framework.
3.1 Skill-Biased Technical Change and Wage Ratios
In this section, I analyze the local change in inequality implied by skill-biased technical change
studying the response of the total and the marginal price of skills in () (s) for the wage function
(14)27.
An increase in  a¤ects the wage (the second term in (16)) through (i) rent sharing, (ii)
selection, and (iii) assignment. The rst term captures a negative "share" e¤ect. For a xed rent
level in the rm, the share of it going to managers decreases, because technology contributes more
to di¤erences in rm-level productivities. The second term captures a negative "selection" e¤ect.
As  increases, the productivity of all rms improve, and the marginal rm exits (@sc=@ > 0 from
eq. (12)) because of sti¤er competition; since the rent level is just the integral of the marginal rents
from the worst rm upwards, the total rent of all the rms also decreases. The third term represents
an "assignment" e¤ect, and is always positive: each manager gains from a larger contribution of z
to the productivity of the rm.
The elasticity of marginal price of skill ws (s) to  (the rst term in (16)), has only two com-
ponents: the slope of the wage tends to decrease because of selection and to increase through the
assignment e¤ect. Since ws (s) does not contain a share parameter, there is no share e¤ect.
Simple calculations show that () (s) is positive if and only if
 (1   )
sc
@sc
@| {z }
Selection
+ (   1) ln s
sc| {z }
Assignment
>  g1 (s) (1  )| {z }
Share
  g2 (s) (1   )
sc
@sc
@| {z }
Selection
+ g2 (s) (   1) ln s
sc| {z }
Assignment
where g1 (s)  w(s) 1w(s) 2 (0; 1), g2 (s)  w(s) (1 )w(s) 2 (; 1), and g0i (s) > 0 for i = 1; 2.
For managers close enough to the indi¤erence point sd, the assignment and share e¤ects are
negligible, and the negative selection e¤ect dominates. Its impact is greater (more negative) on
the marginal price (left hand side) than on the total price (right hand side) of skills: part of the
selection e¤ect on the level of surplus is borne by prots28. Since the marginal price of skills falls
proportionately more than the wage, the wage ratio between two marginally di¤erent managers
becomes smaller: the local inequality decreases.
For managers skilled enough, the assignment e¤ect becomes dominant: technological change
is biased towards better agents. Again, only a fraction g2 (s) of the assignment e¤ect impacts
the elasticity of the wage level. The marginal price of skills increases proportionately more than
the wage: the ratio of wages between two similar managers becomes higher, and local inequality
27Studying the nominal (as opposed to the real) wage function is without loss of generality since nominal wage
ratios and real wage ratios are the same by denition.
28 In fact, if  ! 0 also g2 (s)! 0, and the selection e¤ect cancels.
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increases29.
Proposition 1 (proven in Appendix A.3) formally states this result:
Proposition 1. There exists a unique skill level s() > sc such that the local change in inequality
from skill-biased technical change is positive for high abilities and negative for low abilities, i.e.,
() (s)  0, s  s().
With these results in hand, it is possible to produce dispersion in the tail (as in Piketty and Saez
(2004)) by looking at wage ratios between abilities above s() : since the change in local inequality is
always positive, any wage ratio increases with . Moreover, it is also possible to replicate divergent
patterns of wage ratios in the right vs. the left tail of the distribution (as in Autor, Katz and Kearney
(2006)). By picking three ability levels s0, s00 and s000 such that s0 < s00 < sc, and s000 > s(), an
increase in  generates a constant ratio in the lower part of the wage distribution (w (s00) =w (s0))
and an increasing ratio in the upper part (w (s000) =w (s00)). By picking three abilities such that
sc < s
0 < s00 < s() and s000 > s(), it is possible to obtain one decreasing and one increasing wage
ratio at di¤erent percentiles in the distribution.
4 The Open Economy
In this section I show the equilibrium determination in an economy where two identical countries
are allowed to trade with each other30. The assumption of identical countries let us focus on the
consequences of trade not stemming from di¤erences in factor endowments or technologies.
A rm needs to produce  units of a good for 1 unit to reach the foreign destination, and f
units of production workers are needed to sell in the export market at all. If the price of rm ' is
p (') in the domestic market, it will be p (') abroad. The surplus from sales on the domestic and
export markets are given respectively by:
vd (z; s) = M

zs
w
 1
(17)
vx (z; s) = 
1 M

zs
w
 1
  f w (18)
where M  1


 1
1 
XP  1.
The earning functions corresponding to equations (6) and (7) are built following steps analogous
to the closed economy. The only di¤erence is that the optimal choice of manager (eq. (4)) depends
on the export status of the rm. Since this status is not known in advance, I postulate the existence
of two cuto¤s sd and sx (for access on the domestic and export market) and then build separately
two sets of rst order conditions, for domestic sellers (earning vd (z; s)) and for exporters (earning
29As an additional remark, note that if the selection e¤ect is close to zero, the region with local decrease in inequality
tends to vanish: selection is necessary for the inequality to decrease among low skill managers.
30All missing algebra details are reported in Appendix A.4.
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vd (z; s) + vx (z; s)). Having obtained two expressions for wd (s) and wx (s), I impose two separate
indi¤erence conditions, wd (sd) = w and wx (sx) = wd (sx), which ensure continuity of the wage
function.
The price index in open economy is now a function of the domestic cuto¤ sd, and of the export
cuto¤ of the other country, which by symmetry is equal to sx. Since both these cuto¤ rms face
the same size of the market M , they can be written one as a function of the other:
sx =
 
 1f
1=(1  )
sd (19)
where I assume that
 
 1f
1=(1  )
> 1 in order to generate the empirically relevant pattern of
partitioning in the export behavior of rms, i.e., sx > sd. The price index can then be written as
P =

   1 w

 
L
1=( 1)
t 

1 +
1

 1=( 1)
s
 =( 1)
d (20)
  1=(+)f =(1  ) (21)
where  is an index of distance between the two economies. While the general structure of the
price index reects its shape in closed economy (eq. (8)), the additional term (1 + 1=) 1=( 1)
shows how competition from abroad lowers the price index at home. Note also that heterogeneity
in both skill and technology contribute to e¤ectively reduce the distance between the two countries
(as +  grows,  becomes smaller).
In an open economy, equilibrium will require for each country: (i) equilibrium in the market
for production workers, (ii) indi¤erence for the marginal agent sd between alternative occupations,
and (iii) trade balance.
The total expenditure of rms on production workers is now  1 X + f wLs
 1
x . This expression
is found integrating separately labor demand for domestic and export sales, and including the xed
requirement to sell abroad, f w, in proportion to the mass of exporters Ls 1x . Using (19), and
equating this expenditure to total income of production workers (condition (i)) I obtain
X =

   1L w

1 

1 +
1


s 1d

(22)
Equation (22) is the parallel in an open economy of eq. (10), the Labor Market Equilibrium
condition. It shows how the possibility to sell abroad a¤ects domestic demand of production
workers: as economies become more integrated, more workers are demanded to pay the xed costs
of export ( decreases), and a lower level of overall expenditure X is su¢ cient to equilibrate demand
and supply of production workers.
The indi¤erence of a rm to sell on the domestic market or to shut down (condition (ii)) simply
requires the surplus in the domestic market given in (17) to be equal to the sum of the outside
options w and 0 when evaluated at sd and zd  tsd: Substituting in such equality the expression
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for the price index (20), using (19) and rearranging, we get
X =

 
L w

1 +
1


s 1d (23)
This equation is the open economy equivalent of (11), the Zero Cuto¤ Earnings: it shows how
competition from abroad a¤ects occupational choices. Stronger trade integration (lower ) makes
competition sti¤er, lowering the price index and increasing the real wage for production workers:
at any expenditure level X, the cuto¤ agent sd must be better to compete in her own market.
To close the model, we need to make sure that these conditions are compatible in the world
economy: if trade balance has to be satised (condition (iii)), this entails a relation between the
relative wage of production workers in the two economies. When countries are identical, this ratio
is simply 1.
Equations (22) and (23) pin down the two endogenous variables of this model, the national
income X and the domestic cuto¤s sd: The exporter cuto¤ sx can then be found using (19), and
the price index using (20). Equating (22) and (23) and solving for sd, I obtain
sd =

1 +
   1
1  (   1) (+ )

1 +
1


(24)
Substituting this value back in (23),
X =

 +    1L w (25)
Figure 2 shows graphically how the equilibrium is determined. Larger demand for production
workers at any given level of expenditure, combined with sti¤er competition on the domestic market
for varieties, both imply a stronger selection among domestic rms, i.e., @sd=@ < 0.
Figure 2 here.
This gure shows the equilibrium determination of the cuto¤ sd and the expenditure level X in an
open economy. The possibility to sell abroad implies that a lower level of expenditure (for any supply
of production workers) is su¢ cient for equilibrium: the Labor Market Equilibrium curve shifts down
and to the right. On the other hand, competition from abroad implies that the marginal rm must
employ a better manager (at any level of domestic expenditure) to stay indi¤erent: the Zero Cuto¤
Earnings curve shifts up and to the right. As a result, the cuto¤ for domestic producers is larger in
open economy.
In open economy, the prot and wage functions can be written as
 (z) =
8>><>>:
(1  )

z
zd
1    1 z 2 [zd; zx)
(1  )
 
1 + 1 
 
z
zd
1    (1 + f) z  zx (26)
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and
w (s) =
8>><>>:


s
sd
1    1+ 1 s 2 [sd; sx)

 
1 + 1 
 
s
sd
1    (1 + f)+ 1 s  sx (27)
The real earnings can easily be obtained dividing by the price index (20). Below the cuto¤s,
we still have  (z) =P = 0 and w (s) =P = P 1.
All the components identied in the closed economy case are present, suitably modied, in
the open economy. The existence of an export market now raises the marginal price of skills for
managers good enough to access it. An exporting manager pays a share  of the total xed cost of
the rm 1 + f , and gets back her opportunity cost 1: her net xed payment is 1   (1 + f) :
In the next section, I use this model to compare the consequences of skill-biased technical change
and trade integration on wages ratios in di¤erent regions of the income distribution.
5 Wage Dispersion in Open Economy
In this section, I rst show that trade integration and skill-biased technical change can both ratio-
nalize increasing wage ratios at the top of the distribution and constant or decreasing wage ratios
at its bottom. I then illustrate these results numerically with a simple parameterization of the
model.
5.1 Observational Equivalence
I start this subsection maintaining the following:
Assumption 1. Fixed costs of exporting are such that f < =.
This restriction assumes that the xed cost to access the export market is less than = times
the xed cost to access the domestic market (which is 1). When assumption 1 is satised, the net
xed payment to an exporting manager 1    (1 + f) is positive, and the elasticity of the wage
function to i 2 f ; g is, in absolute value, always increasing in s. I will later describe the meaning
and the consequences of this assumption, while the numerical simulations will show what happens
when it is violated.
I rst evaluate the e¤ect of trade integration (a reduction in ) on the evolution of wage ratios.
The local change in inequality is
() (s) =
ws (s) 
ws (s)
  w (s) 
w (s)
where w (s) = @w (s) =@ and ws (s) = @2w (s) = (@@s). Now, () (s) < 0 corresponds to an
increase in local inequality following a reduction in trade barriers.
Trade integration a¤ects wages through two channels: (i) a market e¤ect - the reduced marginal
cost that exporters face to sell abroad - which increases the value of skills; and (ii) a selection e¤ect
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- ercer competition at home - which reduces revenues on the domestic market and select some
managers out of the di¤erentiated sector. These two channels have a di¤erent importance for
non-exporters and exporters.
For non-exporters, the selection e¤ect is the only active channel. Using (27), simple calculations
show that () (s) > 0 is always true31:
 (1   ) 
sd
@sd
@| {z }
Selection
>  gd2 (s) (1   )

sd
@sd
@| {z }
Selection
8s 2 (sd; sx)
with gd2 (s)  [w (s)  (1  )] =w (s) for s 2 (sd; sx). As  falls, both the wage and the marginal
price of skill decrease. However, part of the adjustment of the level of surplus is borne by prots,
and hence the marginal price of skill falls more: hence, the wage ratio between two marginally
di¤erent managers also falls.
For exporters, both the market and the selection e¤ects operate. For these agents, () (s) < 0
always holds:
  (   1)
 1 + 1| {z }
Market
  (1   ) 
sd
@sd
@| {z }
Selection
<  gd2 (s)
(   1)
 1| {z }
Market
  gx2 (s) (1   )

sd
@sd
@| {z }
Selection
8s > sx
where gx2  [w (s)  (1   (1 + f))] =w (s) for s  sx. The selection e¤ect still pushes towards a
reduction of local inequality. The market e¤ect raises both the total and the marginal price of
skills. Again, part of the increase in the surplus level benets prots, so the marginal price is more
sensitive: the local wage ratio tends to increase through this channel. For exporters, the market
e¤ect always prevails, and trade integration increases local inequality for all s > sx.
It is then possible to state the following proposition (proven in Appendix A.5):
Proposition 2. There exists a unique skill level s() = sx such that the local change in inequality
is positive for high abilities and negative for low abilities, i.e., () (s)  0, s  s().
Skill-biased technical change, again under Assumption 1, has the same behavior as in closed
economy. In Appendix A.6 I prove the following:
Proposition 3. There exists a unique skill level s() > sd such that the local change in inequality
from skill-biased technical change is positive for high abilities and negative for low abilities, i.e.,
() (s)  0, s  s().
Trade integration and skill-biased technical change operate through partially di¤erent channels.
However, they have the same asymmetric e¤ect across rms: the competitive pressure on low pro-
ductivity rms rise, while rms at the high end of the productivity range increase their earnings.
Because of positive assortative matching in the labor market, this asymmetry reects itself across
31All results are formally proven in Appendix A.5 and A.6.
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low and high skill managers. Hence, trade integration and skill-biased technical change produce
qualitatively similar local changes in inequality and responses of wage ratios: only studying the evo-
lution of wage dispersion in di¤erent regions of the wage distribution is not su¢ cient to disentangle
the source of the pattern.
What is the role of Assumption 1? Among domestic sellers, the elasticity of the wage with
respect to  ; "() (s) ; is always increasing (in absolute value) with ability. When Assumption 1 is
met, the same is true for exporters. When it is violated, however, the wage of high skilled exporting
managers is less sensitive to trade costs reductions than the wage of low skilled exporters: "() (s)
is decreasing in s: In this case, a marginal fall in trade costs raises the wages of all exporters,
but proportionately more the wage of low skilled ones. The wage ratio between an exporter s
and a marginally worse manager become then lower, and the local change in inequality is negative
everywhere, not only among domestic sellers. The reason why local inequality decreases is related
to the size of the xed export cost. From the wage function, a share  of the total xed cost (1 + f)
borne by an exporting rm is paid by the manager; hence, when f is higher, the elasticity of the
wage to  is larger, ceteris paribus; however, since f is a xed cost, its increase does not a¤ect
the elasticity of the marginal price of skill. When f is high enough, the total xed payment to
the manager becomes negative (in fact, f > = () 1    (1 + f) < 0), and the elasticity of the
wage becomes larger than the elasticity of the marginal price of skills: hence, () (s)  0; and local
inequality decreases even for exporters.
An analogous argument holds for "() (s). When f < =, the local change in inequality
goes monotonically from negative to positive values along s (i.e., the elasticity of the wage to ,
"() (s) is monotonically increasing in s). When f > =, this is no longer necessarily the case:
local inequality always decreases for low-skill domestic sellers, and always increases for high-skill
exporters; in between, cases can be constructed where local inequality changes in either direction
for the worst exporters32.
In summary, when Assumption 1 is violated, the qualitative predictions of trade and skill-
biased technical change no longer coincide. In this case, the behavior of wage ratios is even more
articulated. In the next subsection, I provide some numerical examples both when Assumption 1
is satised, and when it is not, while in the following section, I suggest a way in which detailed
rm-level data may be used to partially disentangle these mechanisms.
I close this section emphasizing that the relation between changes in the wage ratio between two
arbitrary abilities s0 and s00 and local inequality (Section 3) has to be slightly amended in open econ-
omy to accommodate the existence of another destination market. Around the exporterscuto¤, the
response of w (sx + ds) =w (sx   ds) to changes in i 2 f ; g is given by "(i) (sx + ds) "(i) (sx   ds),
the di¤erence in the elasticities of the wage. However, while "(i) (sx   ds) only encompasses re-
sponses on the domestic market, "(i) (sx + ds) also counts the benets of the additional export
market, and it is not possible to reduce the change in w (sx + ds) =w (sx   ds) to a local measure33.
32See the discussion in Appendix A.6.
33Formally, "i (s) is discontinuous at s = sx; hence, @"i (s) =@s is not dened.
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Intuitively, a small di¤erence in ability generates a large change in the skill premium, and hence in
the wage ratio. The general change in the wage ratio between s0 and s00 in response to a change in
i 2 f ; g can now be written as34Z sx
s0
ws (s)
w (s)
(i) (s) ds+ I(i)
 
s0; s00

D(i) +
Z s00
sx
ws (s)
w (s)
(i) (s) ds
with
I(i)
 
s0; s00

= 1 if sx 2
 
s0; s00

, and 0 otherwise
D(i)  lim
s!s+x
"(i) (s)  lim
s!s x
"(i) (s)
In this notation, D(i) is the adjustment in the response of the wage ratio due to the marginal
exporter accessing the foreign market35. This adjustment is positive if and only if the exogenous
change in  or  is increasing the surplus for the indi¤erent exporter. Hence, trade integration
always increases the response of the wage ratio (i.e., D() < 0), while skill-biased technical change
increases it if and only if the marginal increase in  is raising the total surplus (i.e., D() > 0()h
@ (s=sd)
1  =@
i
s=sx
> 0).36
5.2 A Simple Parameterization
This subsection provides some simple numerical simulations to illustrate the articulated behavior of
wage ratios. The exercise consists in showing contour plots of some wage ratios in a reasonable (; )
space. I also show wage ratios as a function of  , for values of the xed cost of export f that satisfy
and do not satisfy Assumption 1. To parameterize the model, I need three numbers, ; ; and .
I adopt the interpretation of the manager as a top executive in the rm because of the availability
of data that can help pin down  in a simple way. Other approaches are certainly possible, and are
discussed below. I will set  = 1:1: such a low value is necessary to satisfy  > 0 and still leave
some room for variation in the values of . Luttmer (2007) reports that the slope in the tail of
the size distribution of rms is  1:06; in my model, this slope imposes [(   1) (+ )] 1 = 1:06.
Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) report that the average ratio of managerial rents to rmsearnings
between 1993 and 2003 has been 0:066; this fact implies = = 0:066.37 These relations together
deliver  ' 0:58 and  ' 8:85. In all graphs, I let  vary between 1 and 4; moreover, I keep 
xed, and let the technology parameter vary between =2 = 4:42 and the maximum  compatible
with  < 1, which is roughly 9:3. Note that Assumption 1 is satised as long as the xed cost of
exporting is less than or equal to 8:85=0:58 ' 15: 3 times the xed cost of accessing the domestic
market.
34See Appendix A.7.
35This expression reduces to
R s00
s0
ws(s)
w(s)
(i) (s) ds if sx 62 (s0; s00).
36See again Appendix A.7.
37 In fact, for rms large enough, w (s) = (z (s)) ' = since the incidence of the opportunity cost of being a
production worker is small.
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Figures 3.a, 3.b, 3.c here.
This panel shows contour plots for the wage ratio indicated at the top of each gure in the (; )
space. The Figures are drawn setting  = 1:1  = 0:58, and f = 2. The assumptions  2 (0; 1) ;
f < =; and  1f > 1 hold at all points in the plane.
Figures 3.a-3.c focus on the case where f < =. I choose f = 2 : to export, a rm must pay
twice the xed cost it pays to sell at home. In any panel, a point in the (; ) space completely
characterizes the relevant state in the economy. In particular, each point on (; ) has an associated
domestic cuto¤ and export cuto¤ (not shown). Points A and B are chosen as an illustration and
have the same coordinates in all panels, A = (6; 1:45) and B = (8; 1:45). A movement to the right
along the  axis represents an episode of skill-biased technical change, while a movement down
along the  axis represents an episode of trade integration. Each panel plots the behavior of a
di¤erent wage ratio: p70=p50, p90=p70, and p99=p90; from left to right. Points A and B are chosen
so that p70=p50 is the wage ratio between two domestic sellers, p90=p70 is the ratio between an
exporter and a non-exporter, and p99=p90 is the ratio between two exporters.
An economy located at point A has a qualitatively similar behavior in the three wage ratios
in response to trade integration and skill-biased technical change. In both cases, the p99=p90 and
p90=p70 ratios increase, and the p70=p50 ratio decreases. At point A, an observer only looking at
these wage ratios would not be able to disentangle the cause of the change.
At point B, the response to trade is the same as in A: However, technical change is now
increasing the wage ratio only in the p99=p90 ratio. At such a large initial level of the technology
parameter , the domestic cuto¤ is so high that selection and share e¤ect prevail also in the p90=p70
region. In this case, the response of the economy is di¤erent for the three wage ratios; however,
this diversity preserves the same qualitative characteristics as those of point A:
Presumably,  and  move at the same time. The simple case of f < = is already able to
deliver a very articulated path of the wage ratios along an exogenous trajectory of the (; ) space:
since there is no monotonicity in the contour plots, inequality can increase and then decrease in
the same region over time.
Figures 4.a to 4.c show the behavior of some wage ratios when f > =. These Figures require
a xed cost of export 20 times higher than the xed cost to sell at home.
Figures 4.a, 4.b, 4.c here.
Figures 4.a and 4.b show the reported wage ratios as a function of  ; when  = 8. At all points,
Figure 4.a is the ratio between two exporters, and Figure 4.b is the ratio between an exporter and a
domestic seller. Figure 4.c shows contour plots for the wage ratio p99=p90 in the (; ) space. All
gures are drawn setting  = 1:1  = 0:58, and f = 20. The assumptions  2 (0; 1) ; f > =; and
 1f > 1 hold at all points in all Figures.
In this example, xed costs are so high that most of the managers are just domestic sellers: the
ratio p99:5=p99 is between two exporters, but the p99=p98:5 is between an exporter and a domestic
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seller. Figure 4.a shows the ratio p99:5=p99 (between two exporters for all values of ) when  = 8
(as in point B). As predicted, this ratio falls with trade integration since the wage of the exporter
at p99:5 is less sensitive than the one at p99 to trade costs reductions. The ratio p99=p98:5 (gure
4.b) however is always between an exporter and a domestic seller, and it shows that even if local
inequality decreases everywhere, some wage ratios may still increase. This behavior is dictated by
the adjustment due to the marginal exporter accessing the foreign market, D(), as described in the
preceding Subsection. A similar response occurs at point B in gure 4.c, where the ratio p99/p90
is still between an exporter and a non-exporter. The ratio p90=p70 and p70=p50 at B, and all three
ratios at A (not shown) still decrease in response to trade.
Point C ( = 7:4;  = 2:6), nally, illustrates a case where a given wage ratio can fall and then
increase because of trade. At this point, the exporterscuto¤ is slightly above the 99th percentile,
and hence the ratio is between two domestic sellers. As  decreases, the change in local inequality
among them is negative, and the p99/p90 ratio falls. As  continue falling, the exporters cuto¤
falls below the 99th percentile, the manager at the 99th percentile becomes an exporter, and the
ratio starts rising again because of the adjustment D().
This simple parameterization fails to capture the magnitude of the observed ratios in U.S.: the
response of ratios to changes in parameters is quite at, and levels are also very underestimated.
For example, the implied p90=p50 ratio at point A in Figures 3.a and 3.b is roughly 1.16, and is
not moving much in the (; ) space; by comparison, the same observed wage ratio for males has
moved from about 1:6 in 1963 to about 2:3 in 2005 (see Fig. 3 in Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008)).
To summarize, the response of wage ratios to trade and skill-biased technical change can be
quite complex, and are qualitatively similar when f < =, while they may or may not be the same
otherwise38. Even if the specic channels are di¤erent, the similarity arises because they both act
asymmetrically across productive and unproductive rms, and because sorting on the labor market
transmits this asymmetry across di¤erent skill levels.
In the next section, I argue that focusing the attention on the di¤erent channels through which
trade integration and skill-biased technical change operate may give further insights on how to
disentangle these forces.
6 Intra-Firm Rent Distribution
The response of wage ratios depends on the region of the skill distribution one considers, and on
the relative size of domestic and foreign market access costs. To gain further insight, I suggest
to exploit the di¤erences in the specic channels through which skill-biased technical change and
trade integration operate at rm level.
Here I focus on the intra-rm rent distribution. The rent created in a rm by a manager and an
idea is given by the sum of prots and managers wage (i.e., the surplus) less their opportunity cost
in the alternative occupation. Noting that the assignment (5) allows us to write z (s) =z (sd) = s=sd,
38Also note that as technology becomes more skill biased, Assumption 1 tends to be less and less restrictive.
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we can use the earning functions (26) and (27) to express the rent for an exporting and a non-
exporting rm as
 (z (s)) + w (s)  w 
8><>:

s
sd
1    1 s 2 [sd; sx) 
1 + 1 
 
s
sd
1    (1 + f) s  sx
The share of this rent that goes to managers is then
w (s)  w
 (z (s)) + w (s)  w = 
where   = (+ ); a share 1   is then left for prots. This fact is true for any rm, indepen-
dently of its export status, and irrespectively of the validity of Assumption 1.
The intra-rm rent distribution is only a function of the relative contribution of types to the
overall productivity of the rm. In particular, it is not a function of the level of trade integration,
not even in exporting rms. The reason is that in equilibrium, the wage function equates the
marginal benets and costs of a better manager in all markets where the rm chooses to sell;
hence, a fraction  of the additional rent that a higher ability generates in each market is given
to the manager: while trade integration a¤ects the level of the rents reaped by a rm, it does not
a¤ect the way in which this rent is shared.
These observations suggest that a promising avenue for disentangling the two e¤ects is to look at
the intra-rm rent distribution. Firm-level data on employers and employees, properly interpreted,
can give a handle on the evolution of . Changes in inequality not accompanied by changes in the
intra-rm rent distribution must be attributed to trade. Vice-versa, changes in the intra-rm rent
distribution must imply changes in local inequality and wage ratios caused by skill-biased technical
change39.
A simple way to implement this rm-level analysis is reported in Appendix A.8, and involves
having data on the payments to production workers, non-production workers and capital at rm
level. Admittedly, this strategy is very dependent on the functional form assumptions, and only
provides partial conditions: for example, a fall in  does not exclude a role for trade integration.
However, the general point I want to illustrate still remains: progress can be made by explicitly
spelling out the di¤erent mechanisms through which these two forces operate, and focusing on their
di¤erent implications at rm level.
39Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) actually show that the ratio of payments to top executives over rmsearnings
has grown in the period 1993-2003, i.e.,  has increased. They discuss the role of bargaining between executives and
directors when directors have interests aligned with those of the shareholders vs. when they do not. While these
topics are certainly interesting, they fall well outside the scope of this model. Moreover, looking to top-executives
earning is not the only way to approach the empirical implications of this framework. Appendix A.8 discusses an
alternative approach.
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7 Conclusion
I have shown that local wage inequality responds in similar ways to both skill-biased technical
change and trade integration. Both shocks have asymmetric e¤ects across rms, raising the com-
petitive pressure on low productivity ones, while favoring rms in the right tail of the productivity
distribution. Because of positive assortative matching, low and high productivity rms are exactly
those who hire low and high skill managers, respectively. As a result, both shocks have asymmetric
e¤ects across the ability spectrum: skill-biased technical change and trade integration can - under
appropriate parametersrestrictions - both reproduce either parallel or divergent patterns of wage
ratios in the lower and the upper tail of the wage distribution, thus being consistent with the
evidence on wage inequality in the last 50 years in the United States.
This result suggests the value of modeling the labor market implications of these two mechanisms
in order to derive explicitly the dependence of the wage function on economy-wide parameters. I
argue that by spelling out their di¤erent channels of operation, one may derive restrictions on
the behavior of observables that can help disentangle the magnitude of the impact of skill-biased
technical change and trade integration.
I acknowledge that this model is still too stylized in many respects to attempt a serious quanti-
cation of the importance of these two mechanisms. I emphasize that a reasonable parameterization
fails to capture both the level and the magnitude of the change in inequality that has been observed
in the U.S. since the sixties. However, it has the virtue of uncovering the link between micro-level
behavior and the aggregate evolution of wage ratios, emphasizing new avenues of investigation,
such as the intra-rm rent distribution.
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A Proof of Results
A.1 Invariance of the Productivity Distribution
The assumption of  1 on the exponents of the distribution of ideas and managers is without loss
of generality: by suitably redening the units, we can always recover the same distribution of
rm-level productivities and contributions of factor types.
Let G (z) = Tz z (with z  1) denote the measure of ideas at least as good as z. The con-
tribution of ideas to the rm-level productivity is z, and its distribution satises T Pr fz > ag =
Ta z=. We want to show that there exist a ~z and ~ such that (1) the measure of ideas ~z better
than any value a is Ta 1 and that (2) the distribution of ~z still assigns to ~z~ the same distrib-
ution that z has. Let ~z  zz , and ~  =z. Hence, the measure of ideas ~z better than a is
T Pr f~z > ag = T Przz > a	 = Ta 1: ~z has a distribution with shape parameter 1. Moreover,
T Pr

~z~ > a
	
= T Pr

~z > az=
	
= T
 
az=
 1
which is then equal to the distribution of z. An
analogous argument, with ~s  ss and ~  =s, establishes the equivalence for the population of
managers. Since z and s have the same distribution as ~z~ and ~s~, it must also be true that the
product of these two variables, ~z~~s~, has the same distribution as zs.
A.2 The Local Change in Inequality
For two ability levels s00 > s0, we want to study the direction of the change in w (s00) =w (s0) as
 increases. Denote with w (s) the derivative of the wage function with respect to , and with
"() (s)  w (s) =w (s) the point elasticity of the wage. Then, the elasticity of the wage ratio with
respect to , call it " (s0; s00), is simply " (s00)  " (s0). Since the choice of the percentiles (and then
of the abilities) is arbitrary, it is convenient to express this elasticity as
"
 
s0; s00

=
Z s00
s0
@" (s)
@s
ds
The elasticity of the wage with respect to  generally varies with the ability level: the function
@" (s) =@s describes this dependence. Moreover, its sign will determine if the local contribution of
the ability level s is to increase or decrease all the wage ratios that contain it. Calculating @"(s)@s
explicitly,
@" (s)
@s
=
ws (s)
w (s)
() (s)
() (s)  ws (s)
ws (s)
  w (s)
w (s)
where ws (s) is the marginal wage at s and ws (s) is the cross-partial derivative of the wage function
with respect to  and s: The sign of () (s) is what matters to determine the direction of the local
change in inequality.
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A.3 Skill-Biased Technical Change in Closed Economy
Recall that eq. (16) denes () (s)  ws(s)ws(s)  
w(s)
w(s) :
Di¤erentiating (14) with respect to , multiplying by =w (s), and normalizing w to 1, we have
w (s)
w (s)
=
 (   1)
 (j (s)  1) + 1

 j (s)  1
1   + h (s) j (s)

(28)
ws (s)
ws (s)
= (   1)h (s) (29)
with
j (s) 

s
sc
1  
h (s)  ln s
sc
  (+ ) 1
sc
@sc
@
and where   = (+ ) and   1  (   1) (+ ). The function j (s) is always greater than or
equal to 1, j0 (s) > 0, and is such that lims!sc j (s) = 1, lims!1 j (s) = +1. The function h (s) is
always increasing in s and has the properties lims!sc h (s) =   (+ ) 1sc @sc@ < 0, since the cuto¤
sc is increasing in  (this is immediate from eq. (12)), and lims!1 h (s) = +1; hence, h (s) crosses
zero only once.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique skill level s() > sc such that the local change in inequality
from skill-biased technical change is positive for high abilities and negative for low abilities, i.e.,
() (s)  0, s  s().
Proof. For () (s) > 0 is necessary and su¢ cient that ws(s)ws(s)  
w(s)
w(s) is positive. Using (28) and
(29) in this di¤erence and rearranging, we have
() (s)  0, ws (s)
ws (s)
  w (s)
w (s)
> 0,
(1  )h (s) >   1
1    (j (s)  1)
The left-hand side starts at (1  )h (sc) < 0 and always increases with s, crossing zero only once,
while the right-hand side starts in zero and always decreases with s. Hence, there is one and only
one s() such that () (s)  0 , s  s(). This s() is the unique solution of (1  )h  s() =
  11  
 
j
 
s()
  1.
Note that if h (sc) were zero, the left- and right-hand side would touch for s = sc and then
diverge from each other, so that we would have s() = sc and no region with a negative local
change in inequality.
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A.4 Equilibrium in an Open Economy
Following the steps indicated in Section 4, simple calculations deliver the earning functions in each
country corresponding to (6) and (7) in open economy:
 (z) =
8<: (1  )

t 
w
 1
M

z1    z1  d

z 2 [zd; zx)
(1  )

t 
w
 1
M
h
z1    z1  d

+ 1 

z1    z1  x
i
z  zx
(30)
w (s) =
8<: 
 
t
w
 1
M

s1    s1  d

+ w s 2 [sd; sx)

 
t
w
 1
M
h
s1    s1  d

+ 1 

s1    s1  x
i
+ w s  sx
(31)
To connect the selection of domestic and foreign sellers, I set the surplus in (17) and (18) to
w and 0, respectively, to characterize sd and sx; substituting the assignment function (5), solving
both expressions for M and equating them, I obtain sx =
 
 1f
1=(1  )
sd, which is eq. (19).
The price index in open economy is P =  1 
1=( 1)Lt  w
h
s  d + 
1 s  x
i1=(1 )
. I use (19)
to eliminate s  x and get the expressions (20) and (21).
To obtain the earning functions (26) and (27) I use the assignment function (5) in the surplus
(17), impose equality to w, and express the market size M as
M = wt ( 1)s (+)( 1)d = w
t( 1)z (+)( 1)d
I use this expression to substitute out M and equation (19) to eliminate the exporterscuto¤s
in the prot and wage functions (30) and (31): this last step delivers (26) and (27).
A.5 Local inequality and Trade Integration
Di¤erentiating (27) with respect to  , and using j (s)  (s=sd)(+)( 1), the elasticity of wage to
 is a piecewise function of the form:
w (s)

w (s)
=
8<:   (1   )
j(s)
(j(s) 1)+1

sd
@sd
@ s 2 (sd; sx)
  (   1)
h
(+ ) sd
@sd
@
 
1 + 1 

+ 1 
i
j(s)
[j(s)(1+1 ) (1+f)]+1 s > sx
(32)
The elasticity of the marginal price of skills is
ws (s)

ws (s)
=
(   (1   ) sd @sd@ s 2 (sd; sx)
  (   1)
h
(+ ) sd
@sd
@
 
1 + 1 

+ 1 
i
1
(1+1 ) s > sx
(33)
Also, note that the square bracket
h
(+ ) sd
@sd
@
 
1 + 1 

+ 1 
i
in the exporter sections of
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each function is positive, since, di¤erentiating (24) and using   1=(+)f =(1  )
(+ )

sd
@sd
@
 
1 + 1 

+ 1  =   1
1 + 
 
1 + 1 

+ 1  > 0,
(1 + ) 1  > 1 + 1  ,   1f =(1  ) > 1
which is always true.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique skill level s() = sx such that the local change in inequality
is positive for high abilities and negative for low abilities, i.e., () (s)  0, s  s():
Proof. Local inequality increases with trade integration if and only if () (s) < 0.
For domestic sellers, using (32) and (33), this will happen if and only if
ws (s)

ws (s)
< w (s)

w (s)
,   (1   ) 
sd
@sd
@
<
 (   1) j (s)
 (j (s)  1) + 1

sd
@sd
@
,
1 <
j (s)
 (j (s)  1) + 1 , 1   < 0
which is never true. Hence, local inequality always decreases for domestic sellers.
For exporters, using (32) and (33) local inequality increases if
ws (s)

ws (s)
< w (s)

w (s)
,
  (   1)
h
(+ ) 1sd
@sd
@
 
1 + 1 

+  
i
(1 + 1 )
 <
 j (s) (   1)
h
(+ ) 1sd
@sd
@
 
1 + 1 

+  
i

 [j (s) (1 + 1 )  (1 + f)] + 1
Since the term in the square bracket is always positive, we can simplify further to obtain
ws (s)

ws (s)
< w (s)

w (s)
, 1
(1 + 1 )
>
j (s)
 [j (s) (1 + 1 )  (1 + f)] + 1
, 1   (1 + f) > 0, f < 

Hence, local inequality increases for exporters as trade barriers fall if and only if f < =:
A.6 Local Inequality and Skill-Biased Technical Change in Open Economy
The elasticity of wage to skill is now a piecewise function of the form

w (s)
@w (s)
@
=
(
  (1  ) g1 (s) + gd2 (s) (   1)h (s; ) s 2 (sd; sx)
  (1  ) g1 (s) + gx2 (s) (   1)h (s; ) s > sx
(34)
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with
h (s; ) 

ln
s
sd
  (+ ) 1
sd
@sd
@

(35)
g1 (s)  w (s)  1
w (s)
;
gd2 (s) 
w (s)  (1  )
w (s)
, gx2 (s) 
w (s)  [1   (1 + f)]
w (s)
and the dependence on  through sd is always left implicit.
The elasticity of the marginal price of skills to  is always

ws (s)
ws (s) = (   1)h (s)
For a domestic seller, s 2 (sd; sx), local inequality increases if and only if

ws (s)
ws (s) >

wx (s)
@wx (s)
@
,
h (s; ) >   
1  
1
1   (j (s)  1)  rhsd (s; ) (36)
In particular, as s ! sd, the inequality is never satised: for the worst managers, local inequality
always decreases. For an exporter s  sx, local inequality increases if and only if

ws (s)
ws (s) >

wx (s)
@wx (s)
@
,
h (s; ) >   
1   (1 + f)
1
1   
 
1 + 1 

j (s)  (1 + f)  rhsx (s; ) (37)
I distinguish two cases, based on whether or not Assumption 1 holds.
Case 1: Assumption 1 holds, f < =
Proposition 3 There exists a unique skill level s() > sd such that the local change in inequality
from skill-biased technical change is positive for high abilities and negative for low abilities, i.e.,
() (s)  0, s  s().
Proof. Note that in both (36) and (37), (i) @h (s; ) =@s > 0 and lims!+1 h (s; ) = +1, while
(ii) @rhsi (s; ) =@s < 0 and lims!+1 rhsi (s; ) =  1, for i 2 fd; xg :40 Hence, for the values of s
where each relation applies: if the inequality is satised for an s0, it is also satised for all s > s0; if
it is not satised for an s0, it is also not true for all s < s0. To prove the existence of this threshold
and identify the region it falls in, I check the value of each inequality at s = sx. Then, after some
40The function rhsx (s; ) is decreasing because, by assumption, f < =, [1   (1 + f)] > 0.
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algebra, dene:
lhs ()  h (sx; ) = ln f
1=(1  )1=(+)
1 + f  =(1  ) 1=(+)
  + 
1 + (   1) = 

   1
 
2
rhsd ()  rhsd (sx; ) =   
1  
1
1   
 
f 1   1
rhsx ()  rhsx (sx; ) =   
1   (1 + f)
1
1   
 
f 1   1
These functions describe the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (36) and (37) when s = sx.
Note that rhsd () > rhsx () 8 . The function lhs () can be in three positions with respect
to this inequality.
(i) Suppose that rhsd () > rhsx () > lhs (): at s = sx inequality (37) is not satised, and
the local inequality for the worst exporters is decreasing; then, it is also decreasing among the all
domestic sellers, and there must exists a threshold s() > sx such that local inequality decreases
below it and increases above it.
(ii) Suppose that lhs () > rhsd () > rhsx () : at s = sx inequality (36) is satised, and local
inequality for the best domestic sellers is increasing; then, local inequality is also increasing among
all exporters, and there must exists a threshold s() 2 (sd; sx) such that local inequality increases
above it and decreases below.
(iii) Suppose that rhsd () > lhs () > rhsx (): at s = sx, (36) is not satised while (37) is,
and so local inequality increases for all exporters and decreases for all non-exporters. In this case,
s() = sx.
Note that s() = sx (case (iii)) is not a knife edge case. Since rhsd () > rhsx () holds strictly
and lhs () changes continuously with  , s() = sx occurs for  2 (d; x), with d : rhsd (d) =
lhs (d) and x : rhsx (x) = lhs (x).
To show that each of the cases (i)-(iii) can occur along a path of trade integration, suppose
f = 1. Then, lim!1 lhs () < 0, lim!1 rhsd () = lim!1 rhsx () = 0. Since, as  ! 1, lhs ()
goes monotonically to +1 while both rhs functions go monotonically to  1 , lhs () will cross
once rhsx () and then rhsd () from below. In this construction, moving  from autarky (+1) to
perfect integration ( = 1) will let the economies visit case (ii), (iii) and nally (i).
Case 2: Assumption 1 does not hold, f > =.
Assumption 1 does not modify the properties of h (s; ) and rhsd (s; ): hence, local inequality
always decreases for domestic sellers. When f > =a, however,

ws (s)
ws (s) >

wx (s)
@wx (s)
@
() h (s; ) < 
 (1 + f)  1
1
1   
 
1 + 1 

j (s)  (1 + f)
where now  (1 + f)   1 > 0. Hence, the right-hand side is now positive and increasing in s, and
goes to +1 as s ! 1. To show that local inequality always increases among the best exporters,
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note that this inequality is of the form
ln s A1 < A2s1   A3
with A1; A2 and A3 positive constants41. Since 1   > 0, for s large enough it is always satised,
so that local inequality always increases also among the best exporters.
For intermediate values of s; parameters can be found such that the local inequality for the worst
exporters decreases or increases. The accompanying online Mathematica notebook plots both sides
of the inequality against s for s  sx under two alternative parameter combinations to show it42.
A.7 Local Inequality and Wage Ratios in Open Economy
The elasticity of the wage ratio w (s00) =w (s0) with respect to i 2 f ; g is always the di¤erence
between the elasticities of the wage evaluated at the two abilities, "(i) (s00)  "(i) (s0) : The function
"(i) (s0) is discontinuous at s = sx. I prove this by directly showing lims!s+x "
(i) (s) lims!s x "(i) (s).
For i =  ; using (32),
D()  lim
s!s+x
"() (s)  lim
s!s x
"() (s) =  f 
 + 1
   1
w (sx)
which is always negative. For i = ; using (34), after some algebra I obtain
D()  lim
s!s+x
"() (s)  lim
s!s x
"() (s) = f
 (   1)
w (sx)
h (sx; )
where h (sx; ) is given in (35). It is easy to show that (   1)h (s; )  @ (s=sd)1  =@, so
that h (sx; ) is the derivative of (s=sd)
1  for the marginal manager sx. Note that in principle,
h (sx; ) can be positive or negative, and so D() 7 0() h (sx; ) 7 0. The accompanying online
Mathematica notebook plots "(i) (s) under two alternative parameter combinations to show it.
Accounting for the discontinuity, we can rewrite the di¤erence between the two elasticities in
terms of local change in inequality as
"(i)
 
s00
  "(i)  s0 = Z sx
s0
@"(i) (s)
@s
ds+ I(i)
 
s0; s00

D(i) +
Z s00
sx
@"(i) (s)
@s
ds =
=
Z sx
s0
ws (s)
w (s)
(i) (s) ds+ I(i)
 
s0; s00

D(i) +
Z s00
sx
ws (s)
w (s)
(i) (s) ds
with I(i) (s0; s00) = 1 if sx 2 (s0; s00), and 0 otherwise.
41 In particular, A1  ln sd + (+ ) 1sd
@sd
@
, A2  (1+f) 1 11  
 
1 + 1 

s
 (1  )
d and A3  (1+f) 1 11  (1 + f).
42 In the notebook, I plot h (s) making use of the fact that, after some algebra, +
sd
@sd
@
= +
1+( 1)= 

 1
 
2
+
1
+1
1
1  
 
ln  1f

:
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A.8 A Simple Implementation of the Intra-Firm Rent Distribution
Let the total value added of a rm ' be V A ('), and denote with Ws (') and Wu (') the total
payments to skilled and unskilled workers, respectively. Assume that a rm with Ls (') skilled
workers is actually a set of Ls (') production lines, i.e., each skilled worker would be a manager.
The surplus v (') in the model is then v^ (')  (V A (') Wu (')) =Ls ('). To move from the
surplus to the rent, we must have an estimate of the opportunity cost of the skilled workers: we
can use the wage of an unskilled worker in the same rm, w^u (')  Wu (') =Lu (') : Hence, the
average rent in a rm is v^ (')   w^u ('), and the share of this rent going to the "manager" would
be estimated to ^ (')  (w^s (')  w^u (')) = (v^ (')  w^u (')), where w^s (')  Ws (') =Ls (') is the
average wage for skilled workers. It is easy to show that for ^ (') 2 (0; 1), we need that the wage
per skilled worker is larger than the wage per unskilled worker and that there are some payments
to capital43.
The model would predict that this share is constant across rms, and is not a¤ected by trade
integration, so that changes in the average  over time would measure the intensity of skill-biased
technical change.
43Note that, substituting the denitions given in the text, ^ (')  Ws(')=Ls(') Wu(')=Lu(')
(V A(') Wu('))=Ls(') Wu(')=Lu(') . Assume that
the numerator in ^ (') is positive (i.e., the average wage for skilled workers is larger than the average wage for
unskilled workers); then the estimated share will be smaller than 1 as long as
(V A (') Wu (')) =Ls (') Ws (') =Ls (') > 0() V A (') > Wu (') +Ws (')
i.e., as long as there are some payment to capital. If this is true, then it is also su¢ cient for ^ (') to be positive, since
the requirement would be V A (') =Ls (') > Wu (') (1=Lu (') + 1=Lu ('))() V A (') > w^u (') (Ls (') + Lu (')).
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